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Vogel: Churchill and the Historians

More seriously but not Copp's
fault there is a major problem with
the transcription of French names.
Major Leon Brosseau, D Company
commander, killed in action, is
referred to as Lucien. Killed in the
same action is the mortar platoon
commander, Captain Orieux,
referred to in the book as Oriens. A
friend of this reviewer, Major Alex
Angers, shot through the throat, is
referred to as Alexander not as
Alexandre, which is his real name.
These may seem small errors.but
in work such as this, precision is
most desirable if only out of respect.
In a three-line quote requiring
simple transcription (p.lll) there
are five mistakes. An alert and
qualified proof reader could have
spotted these errors.
Copp's conclusion that the
Canadians proved the equals,
indeed, the betters oftheir enemies
is contrary to the impressions
created by Canada's dean of
military history, C.P. Stacey. The
tendency in Stacey's time was to
perpetuate
the
Canadian
propensity to self-denigration:
something which Copp and others
are no longer willing to accept. The
performance ofthe officers and men
of 5 CIB bears witness to their
forbearance in the face of the
staggering odds stacked against
them emanating paradoxically at
times from the pettiness and
incompetence of some of their own
superiors. Had they been trained
in the best way to meet the realities
of the battlefield? At a very heavy
cost, they bested those who had for
too long been considered the best.
The leadership, Copp correctly
concludes, had been much too slow
in realizing the absolute need for
adequate force-ratios to overcome
well-equipped and desperate
defensive forces.
Gil Drolet is a retired Professor of
War Literature at Le College
militaire royal de Saint-Jean. He
has a special interest in the French
Canadian infantry regiments of the
Second World War.
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mong the vast number ofbooks
recently published about the
Second World War, a large number
are biographies of Churchill or
analyses of his place in that struggle, a reasonable enough endeavour
in that not even his harshest critics
can deny his importance in World
War Two.

A

The immediate reaction to the
selection of books on Churchill
reviewed below is that, with one
exception, they add little to the
vast body of material which already
exists on the subject of Churchill
and the war in general.
Churchill was a prolific writer
and he has left behind a huge body
of written material. Moreover he
rushed to publish his memoirs
immediately after the Second
World War as well as after the

First (of which Lord Balfour so aptly
said; "I hear that he has written a
big book about himself and called it
'The World Crisis."'). Apparently
everyone whoever talked to him or
saw him in the distance has left
behind some clever entry in his
diary or memoirs. Consequently
there exists an absolute treasure
trove of material from which to
mine endless quotations by which
one can prove a variety of likely
and not so likely interpretations of
his actions.
"Not only did Mr. Churchill
both get his war and run it: he also
got in the first account of it." 1 It
was an account, moreover, that was
not only massive and well-written,
but one that was also replete with
documentation. That meant that
Churchill had not only "run" the
Second World War but that he had
also set the agenda for those, at
least those concerned with British
History, who began the process of
writing about it. But after fifty
years and the opening of most of
the archives, this advantage has
begun to wear off. Now Churchill
can be criticized not only for what
he did but also for what he said he
had done. No doubt that is a
problem for all those who are
tempted to write their memoirs,
which nowadays seems to be a
substantial portion of the
population, but a book about
Churchill, his actions and memoirs
can still create enough interest to
get the author close to the bestseller list.
That Churchill had enormous
influence on the direction of the
British war effort has not yet been
called into question, at least not in
the four books reviewed below. He
was aware that "running" a war
was not an easy matter, as he had
personally experienced in World
War One during his somewhat
disastrous stint as First Lord of
the Admiralty. He was also aware
that strategy and war-making only
look easy "That is why critics can
write so cogently, and yet successful
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performers are so rare." 2 The same
comment might well be made about
writers, particularly perhaps,
writers and historians whose
subject is Winston Churchill and
his wars. These fall into a number
of categories: 1) Those who are
concerned with trying to deal
seriously with some issues of his
career which might need some
further exploration; 2) Those who
have some special case to make
about a particular but naturally
crucial aspect of his work; 3) Those
who seem to write simply because
so many others have and 4) Those
who have some contemporary
political axe to grind and want to
use him for that purpose.

Churchill:
A
Major
Reassessment of his Life in Peace
and War, edited by Robert Blake
and Roger Louis is the result of a
conference held at the University
of Texas in March 1991 and clearly
falls into the first category. It was
a gathering of some of the most
distinguished historians of the
period and the book reflects the
expertise which they brought to
the conference. There are twentynine different essays, each dealing
with a particular aspect of
Churchill's life and career. The
essays are naturally rather uneven
in quality- Craig manages to write
about Churchill's view of Germany
without
dealing
with
"unconditional surrender" or
"strategic bombing" in a rather
innocuous essay on an important
subject; Johnson similarly has very
little new to say about Churchill's
relationship with France; Pelling,
dealing with Churchill and the
Labour Party, leaves out what is
surely one of the most important
elements of that relationship,
namelythatofChurchill andAttlee
during the War itself; 3 Michael
Howard contributes a somewhat
disappointing essay on Churchill
and the First World War which is
rather bland for that usually
brilliant historian but nevertheless
covers all the main points. There
are a good many other contributions

which seem to add little to what is
already well known, although they
contain very few instances where
one can seriously quarrel with the
authors. Perhaps R.V. Jones's,
"Churchill and Science," should be
singled out as an essay which does
not even live up to its title- it is
really an essay about the
relationship between Churchill and
Lindemann and not a very useful
one at that. It does not deal with
the really important issues- such
as "Operational Research"- which
is surely as important an aspect of
Churchill's use of science as
Lindemann's ability to calculate
the amount of champagne
Churchill had drunk - an
extremely well-worn story.
On the other hand, Addison
provides a very useful and effective
summary ofhis latest book, 4 which
should provide much food for
thought for those who see Churchill
only as a somewhat flamboyant
warrior. D.C. Watt's essay on
Appeasement is critical but fair, as
is Hinsley's on Intelligence. Blake
provides a meticulous and detailed
account of Churchill's succession
to Chamberlain in May 1940, which
is an important balance to the often
held view that his succession was
both popular and inevitable.
Keegan has perhaps the most
difficult task because of the vast
literature in the field of
Churchillian strategy. He offers a
reasonable account of an often
highly emotional and controversial
subject, which includes everything
from strategic bombing, the
"Second Front," and the
Mediterranean strategy to the
Balkans and Churchill's relations
with Stalin.
This is not a book which can
easily be read in a single sitting
but it will surely become a serious
reference work. Its footnotes
provide the reader with a fair crosssection of current research into
many aspects of the first half of the
twentieth century and it expresses,
often elegantly and succinctly, the

ideas of historians who have made
distinguished contributions in their
fields. Individually some of the
essays are often highly critical of
Churchill but collectively, as the
editors point out in their
introduction:
The book pays tribute to his
stature, though sometimes the
investigation is critical and the
judgements are unflattering. The
critical line of approach must not
be misinterpreted as an attempt
to diminish Churchill's reputation.
On the contrary, when subjected
to scrutiny in the light ofhistorical
evidence, Churchill emerges with
both his integrity and his
greatness intact. [p.8]

It remains to be said that it is
a pity that neither Martin Gilbert,
the author of the massive
"authorized" biography nor any of
the now fairly numerous detractors
were present at the conference.

Tuvia Ben-Moshe's book
Churchill: Strategy and History
belongs in many respects to the
second category. The author
promises not only to clarify
Churchill's strategy in both World
Wars but also to show how
Churchill's versions of what
happened are at great variance
with what he actually did. This is
129
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a formidable task and Ben-Moshe
claims that he only reluctantly
came to it after he had devoted
"years to the study of military
history and strategy." [p.4] The
first chapter traces Churchill's
changing views, particularly on the
question of the "continental
commitment" from 1900-1914. Its
conclusion is rather unexceptional,
as is Ben-Moshe's narrative over
the question ofBritain's declaration
of war in 1914. The question of the
Dardanelles campaign is obviously
the centrepiece of the discussion
about the first war. The failure of
that enterprise and Churchill's part
in it are well established, 5 and BenMoshe's attempt to place this
failure into a much wider context
of grand strategy and historical
understanding are somewhat
unconvincing. "Churchill wanted
to have the best of all worlds: he
wished to avoid the extremely costly
direct offensives: but at the same
time he called for a strategy of
attrition (which involved killing as
many Germans as possible) and for
the sort of grand maneuver that
has not been possible since 1916."
[p. 79] The author then rightly
points out that such strategy was
impossible in that war and that the
only alternative was a compromise
peace. This is no doubt correct but
it did not happen. Concluding this
section, the author states that "the
broad tenor of the spirit conveyed
in Churchill's "World Crisis"is that,
had his strategic plans been fully
accepted and properly carried out,
the war would have been shorter
and less costly to the Allies." [p.81]
Of course Churchill is entitled to a
hypothetical and egocentric opinion
but such an opinion is surely no
more amenable to proof than the
author's view that "... had the
strategy that Churchill advocated
after the end of 1915 indeed been
fully implemented, then Germany
would not have been defeated in
1918." [p.81] Unfortunately the
idea that one can readily tell the
outcome of what did not happen
lies at the heart of Ben-Moshe's
critique of Churchill's strategy.

Churchill in opposition is more
to Ben-Moshe's liking. He thinks
that
although
Churchill's
"assessments were now partly
mistaken and characterized by
conservatism" they nevertheless
were more correct "when compared
with predictions of most military
men in Britain and France ... "
[p.120] Again Ben-Moshe is
convinced that he can tell what
was likely to happen if, in this case,
Churchill's policy had been
adopted. Churchill's stay at the
Admiralty receives little attention
in this book. In matters which
seem marginal to the author, the
Norwegian campaign for instance,
he simply claims that this fiasco
was just a repetition of the Gallipoli
campaign [he again leaves out the
French dimension] and suggests
that in this case "the strategic
consequences were not far
reaching." [pp.123-4] Indeed much
of the summer of 1940, including
the Battle of France, the Battle of
Britain and the Battle of the
Atlantic hardly receive any
mention at all. It is naturally the
decision
to
defend
the
Mediterranean strategy and the
consequences of this action with
respect to the U.S. Alliance and
the second front which are the
centrepiece of the book.
In this Ben-Moshejoins a long
line of authors who have very
definite views on this question. 6
He describes carefully and
reasonably the usual catalogue of
errors made during 1941,
particularly the halt of the British
armies in North Africa and the
decision to intervene in Greece.
However it is important to note
that these decisions were made
within the context of the
Mediterranean strategy, not
alternatives to it. Surely the whole
question of Churchill's decision to
defend the Eastern Mediterranean
in the fall of 1940 was based on the
premise that German strategy was
bound to give first priority to the
defeat of Britain. Churchill can be

accused of foolhardiness because
he did not know, when he made his
major decisions, that Hitler
regarded the Mediterranean by the
spring of1941 as a distraction from
his more important concerns. This
is not a point, however, which the
author emphasises. Rather he
takes issue with Michael Howard's
view that the "real" Mediterranean
strategy should be dated from the
fall of 1942 and that what went
before were simply the piecemeal
responses to the difficulties of the
summer of 1940. [p.166] It is not
unreasonable to argue that
obviously the British had
committed themselves to a serious
campaign in the Mediterranean
before either the Russians or the
Americans were attacked, but it is
not so easy to dismiss the essence
of Howard's argument that the
commitment to the North-African
campaign [Operation "Torch"]
represented the point at which the
Mediterranean strategy becomes a
matter for serious debate, both from
the point of view of Anglo-U.S.
relations and in terms of the timing
of the invasion of North-West
France.
Ben-Moshe tries to prove that
in fact Churchill did not change in
his strategy after Pearl Harbour,
and that indeed his strategy had
neither an imperial nor a clear
political aim in 1943. Certainly
the existing documentation does
bear out the idea that in the period
1940-3, Churchill's overwhelming
pre-occupation was the winning of
the war, rather than preserving
the Empire. That seems to be the
main thrust of Ben-Moshe's
accusation, that Churchill really
had no strategy at all, in the sense
that strategy ought to have a clear
political aim. Although why so
many authors seem to think that
winning the war against the Axis
Powers was not a political aim
remains mysterious. However the
lack of political aim is certainly the
main thrust of the conclusion of
Chapter 8.
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Churchill at the controls of the Boeing Flying Boat which carried him across the Atlantic on 14 January 1942.

Unlike others who have
accused Churchill of deliberately
delaying the opening of the second
front for political reasons, BenMoshe takes a rather different line.
He does not think that an invasion
of France could have succeeded in
1943, adding "By its nature, that
hypothesis is not amenable to
decisive proof." [p.27 4] But he does
not follow his own advice about
hypotheses, because he now argues
that had the issue been left to
Churchill alone, there would not
have been an invasion in 1944
either. But surely that again rests
on an even more remote hypothesis
-which is that in 1944, there was
no Russian Front and no U.S. Army
in Europe. It is also based on a
rather special reading of certain
documents, most particularly the
meeting of 19 October 1943. But
surely that meeting, like so many
others, has to be put into context.
Churchill may have had
exaggerated fears of the power of

the German Army, but the author
does not help his case by failing to
recognize the actual course of the
battle in Russia, on which, after
all, so many calculations with
respect to the "second front" were
based. For instance his claim that
the German Armies had effectively
been defeated by the end of 1943
comes as something of a surprise.
"By the end of 1943 it [the Soviet
Union] had effectively defeated the
German Army; its forces had
reached lines approximating
Russia's old borders before the
outbreak ofWorld War II." [p.284]
It is true that Vatutin's First
Ukrainian Army Group had
crossed the 1939 Polish border in
the centre of the Pripet marshes
and taken Sarny by January 12th,
but on that same date Leningrad
was still under siege, Army Group
Centre was less than 7 5 miles from
Smolensk, the Crimea was still
occupied, Oddessa was still in
German hands, in fact the line
north ofPri pet marshes would not

change drastically until June 1944;
although the siege of Leningrad
was lifted and the Estonian border
reached by 2 March 1944. Clearly
the German Army's offensive power
had been effectively contained, but
the notion that it had been fully
defeated is simply untrue.
It is into this general context,
[Kiev was not recaptured by the
Russians until 6 November 1943]
plus the growing apprehension of
the new German weapons that the
meeting of 19 October needs to be
placed. The argument that this
meeting, as well as some others,
were clear indications that
Churchill wanted to avoid
"Overlord" altogether are really far
from obvious. 7 But again the major
difficulty is that in fact the invasion
did take place and therefore
Churchill's intentions during the
second half of 1943, had he been
without any allies, remain a matter
for speculation.
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In Ben-Moshe's last chapter,
which deals with the post-invasion
strategy, Churchill is again accused
of
misunderstanding
the
relationship between military
strategy and political aims which
now naturally revolve around the
Russian question. Ben-Moshe
quotes Liddell Hart tentatively to
suggest that a great opportunity
had been missed in September to
bring the war to an end in 1944. He
also enlists Martin van Creveld to
suggest that Montgomery's
strategy, the proper way to win in
1944, might at least have brought
the Allies to the Ruhr, although
van Creveld concludes his
discussion of this whole subject
with "In the final account the
question
as
to
whether
Montgomery's plan presented a real
alternative to Eisenhower's
strategy must be answered in the
negative." 8
In his concluding chapter BenMoshe argues that by the time the
invasion took place, the Germans
had already been defeated and that
the only real purpose for the
invasion was to shorten the war
and to find a reasonable political
settlement with the Soviet Union.
[p.320] That no doubt will come as
a surprise to the millions of Allied
and Axis soldiers who had to fight
their way through those last bitter
months of the war. Given that he
has argued previously that the
invasion was not really possible in
1943, it is difficult to understand
what the real alternatives were or
why he considers that the Germany
was already beaten in 1943, except,
of course, in hindsight.
Despite the meticulous
scholarship and the carefully
nuanced paragraphs, it is difficult
to find this book convincing;
nevertheless its criticisms of
Churchill's strategy are often
thought-provoking and will
certainly find their place with the
others who have attempted to be
better strategists than Churchill,

at least in their books. Nor, given
some of the questions raised above,
can one readily agree that
Churchill's "Second World War,"
whatever its faults, "is a false
version of events." [p.333]
Richard Lamb's book Churchill
as War Leader: Right or Wrong?
offers a quite different fare from
the two books reviewed above. It
really falls into the third category.
Lamb claims that this book was
especially designed to introduce the
subject to "University and sixth
form students" and that he is an
admirer of Churchill. In fact he
concludes that, "Alone Winston
Churchill
saved
Western
civilization from destruction at the
hands of the Nazis." [p.339] The
difficulty is that there is very little
in this book that would convince
anyone that this was so and it is,
moreover, often expressed in a
rather simplistic fashion.
Surely Lamb is wrong to think
that students should be fed a fare
of utter simplicity, such as his first
chapter on appeasement. "Postwar evidence entirely vindicates
Churchill's claim that the military
situation in 1938 was such that it
was folly to capitulate to Hitler at
Munich." [p.12] is one of many
declaratory sentences which turn
this first chapter into something
less than a reasonable historical
exercise.
Lamb takes us through the fall
of France and the summer of 1940
without mentioning either the
Battle of Britain or the air attacks
on Britain during the winter of
1940-1. In Chapter 8 we are told
that "Churchill had secret
intelligence that the risk ofinvasion
was diminishing," [p.83] so he sent
tanks to the Middle East. It is a
pity that Hinsley did not know this
when he wrote his careful study of
the British Intelligence on the
German invasion plans [see
particularly Hinsley, British
Intelligence, Volume I Chapter 5].

In the chapter in which Lamb
considers the question of the Far
East, he argues that Churchill was
anxious for a war between Japan
and the U.S.A., as that would draw
the Americans into a war with
Germany. The problem is that
none of the evidence which Lamb
presents supports this argument.
Unfortunately much of the rest
of the book follows this pattern.
Unquestionably the surrender of
Singapore marked one of the lowest
points for Churchill in the war;
still it remains a puzzle why there
is a long chapter on the fall of
Singapore, with considerable detail
about the sinking of Force Z,
[Lamb's view that the Japanese
"Zero" was far superior to the
Brewster Buffalo available in the
Malaya peninsula is of course quite
right, except that the Japanese
attacking aircraft had no fighter
cover.] A chapter on India follows
but nothing on the submarine war,
then also at its height, and far
more serious, in Churchill's view,
than his problems in India. Nor
can we find anything about the
resources and the debates devoted
to the strategic air offensive against
Germany [except for the short
reference, on p.151, quoted above.]
There seems no explanation
for the emphasis that Lamb puts
on various aspects of the war.
Churchill's policy in the Aegean,
his desire to bring Turkey into the
war and his "blunders" in
Yugoslavia are described in two
informative chapters but somewhat
out of proportion with respect to
the other elements in the war,
particularly since the other
resistance movements are hardly
mentioned. Lamb is on somewhat
firmer ground when he deals with
the campaign after D-day, having
already written a book on this
subject. Still even here there some
very curious ideas for someone who
professes to admire Churchill. For
instance the notion, which is also
in his larger work, 9 that Churchill
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feared that General Montgomery
was stealing his limelight. [p.281]
Lamb's conclusion goes over
much the same ground as his
chapters- Mers-el-Kebir remains
- "possibly his gravest wartime
blunder" [p.340]- "In his memoirs
Churchill has falsified history not
only over the pusillanimity of
Halifax and Chamberlain in 1940,
but over other important episodes
... Why? He had nothing of which
to be ashamed . . . . " [p.340]
Churchill may have been a great
wartime leader but that surely
cannot be illustrated from a book
which leaves out some of the most
important and difficult campaigns
of the war and makes a good many
mistakes which are so elementary
that a reasonable editor ought to
have caught them ... with friends
like this who needs enemies?
Still there are enemies.
Charmley's book clearly belongs in
the fourth category. Once upon a
time there was a great and peaceful
Empire called the British Empire
until a man called Winston
Churchill came along and was
nasty to a nice man called Hitler
and nice to a nasty man called
Roosevelt and so brought about the
end of Glory! Actually, the theme
of Charmley's Churchill, the End
of Glory is only slightly more
complicated than the above
summary. It is a very large political
biography (742 pp), which stops in
1945, divided into fifty-five
chapters, all of them with witty
titles. The first section which takes
Churchill from birth to 1915 deals
briefly and sharply with the young
Churchill and his overweening
ambition and selfishness. It shows
Charmley at his best, the writing
has flair and the quotations, from a
variety of sources, are trenchant
and amusing. Churchill's first
parting with the Conservative
Party over the question of Free
Trade is handled with vigour and
even fairness. So, in some respects,
are his policies as President of the

Board of Trade and at the Home
Office. However the strain is
beginning to show although only in
a minor way- on p.65 Charmley
deals fairly with the question of
the sending oftroops to Tonypandy
but on p.67 he declares that "The
myth of Churchill calling out the
troops at Tonypandy was, like that
of King Mred burning the cakes,
symbolically true; it epitomized an
attitude." And at the bottom of the
same page, the "battle of Sydney
Street" "seemed to epitomise
Churchill's defects." So the rather
amusing young man is beginning
to turn into a rather more
dangerous political animal.
Charmley's opinion ofthe work
of Churchill at the Admiralty before
the outbreak of the First World
War underlines this change. He
signals this on p.74 "... indeed
without Churchill at the Admiralty,
the policy of the Entente might
well have broken down," and ends
the discussion of the whole naval
question by showing how far
Britain was committed to France
by 1914 and that this was the result
of Churchill not understanding the
political consequences of his naval
policies. [p.82] That is not an
indefensible position. Certainly
British Naval policy in the pre-war
period was of political consequence
and Churchill, inconcentratingthe
Fleet in the North Sea, gave the
French the sense that their security
outside the Mediterranean
depended on British Naval
dispositions. Still one would have
more confidence in Charmley's
naval judgements if he had not
started World War One with "the
sinking of several ships at Scapa
Flow by German submarines" and
demoting
the
German
Battlecruiser Goeben to the status
of a cruiser. [p. 99] As a cruiser she
would no doubt have had little
influence in creating the situation
in which the Russians declared war
on Turkey ... as a Battlecruiser,
which bombarded Russian naval
ports in the Black Sea, it really was
quite another matter.

The Dardanelles failure
obviously made Churchill's position
precarious. Still Charmley argues
that it was because Churchill had
alienated so many that he could
not survive the failure [p.126], it
was the fact that he was so
"immensely self-absorbed ... "" ...
such egoism is common in children
but has usually rubbed away by
the time adulthood is reached"
[p.136] In other words the
substance of the failure had less to
do with his loss of office than his
character. It is a point to which
Charmley returns on numerous
occasions in this long book. It is of
course a view of history which
spares historians the necessity of
trying to trace the course of events
and allows them to deal largely
with extracts from diaries and
memoirs, a technique that used to
be called "scissors and paste," now
made even simpler with the use of
computers!
The second section of the book
covers the period from 1915 to 1939
- "The Lost Leader." After his
time in the trenches - Charmley
never robs Churchill of his personal
courage - there is the return to
politics. Lloyd George wanted
"someone who would cheer him up,"
so he brought back Churchill
despite the opposition of virtually
all his colleagues. [pp.144-5] With
this begins his second career, the
main event of which, according to
Charmley, was the futile
intervention in Russia, which
brought down on him the ire of the
Prime Minister. By February 1920
another of Churchill's schemes lay
in ruins and "once again, Churchill
had demonstrated his greatest gift
- that of isolating himself by
alienating his supporters without
winning over his old enemies."
[p.157]
The pattern for the book has
now been set. There are passages
where Charmley seems to consider
seriously the policies and ideas of
Churchill and the Governments in
which he served, there are passages
133
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which are elegant and caustic ...
"Churchill's defense of the treaty
[the Irish Treaty] in the Commons
the following day was one of his
most effective speeches, thus
proving the truth of his own
comment that "the essence of
statesmanship is platitude," there
would be a final reconciliation
between all the Irish and the
English, " . . . Lacking both
fanaticism and religion, Churchill
was singularly ill-placed to
understand those over-endowed
with both." [pp.175-76] However
the temptation to get in another
sharp
quotation
prevents
Charmley from developing any
single theme coherently for more
than a couple of pages, so the
reader is often left with a jumble of
confused and contradictory ideas.
Churchill's espousal oflost causes
in this section- Free Trade, Egypt,
India, 10 Edward VIII- are difficult
to reconcile with the ruthless,
single-minded ambitious politician
described so far. It may be that
Charmley
really has much
sympathy with Churchill's attempt
to stop the continuous erosion of
British power and influence and is
really rather angry at him for not
succeeding.
Still Charmley
recognizes that "The considerations
of economy, of public opinion and of
the strategic weakness of the
Empire which informed imperial
policy also informed British foreign
policy; in both cases Churchill
ignored the limitations of power."
[p.290]
This informs much of the
discussion ofChurchill's opposition
to Chamberlain's policy after 193 7.
That Churchill was often wrong,
for example in his calculations
about German air power, that he
did not object to appeasing Italy,
that his call for "Grand Alliance"
with a suspicious Russia and a
isolationist America was wishful
thinking is really no longer
seriously disputed. Nor can there
be much dispute with the fact that
Chamberlain seems to have
understood the "limitations of

power" better than his critics. But
that should not lead Charmley into
the startling conclusion that "The
real effect ofthe German occupation
of Prague was on the position of
Churchill," [p.359] although it does
illustrate Charmley's almost
unbelievable
parochialism.
Chamberlain may well have
continued to believe that he could
find a way to avoid war, but he now
set about it in a manner that cannot
be described as simply minor
changes in tactics. Charmley
spends some time dealing with the
abortive negotiations with the
Russians and mentions the
guarantees to Poland but the
critical decision to commit the
British Army once again to the
continent and the beginning of
conscription seems to have entirely
escaped his attention.

Part III, "The Trumpets Silver
Sound, 1939-1945" represents
nearly a third of the book. But once
the war begins Charmley, to borrow
one of his chapter headings, is
completely"at sea." His description
of Churchill at the Admiralty leaves
out almost everything that
happened; one cannot tell whether
Churchill, the second time around,
was a successful First Lord or not,
because while we are treated to a
garbled account of "Operation

Catherine," there is nothing here
about the German submarines, or
about Ocean raiders, about
magnetic mines. Charmley seems
to have read Lamb, [whom he
accuses of" addictions to old myths"
p.381, fn. 70] but not anything
serious about the war at sea. He
thinks that naval historians are a
peculiar "sub-species" [see p.373
fn.16 in which he even gets Lamb's
view wrong]; still they might have
helped him to understand what it
was that Churchill and the Royal
Navy were doing in the winter of
1939-40. He might even have got
the month of Operation "Menace"
right [p.421], or stopped believing
that "Ultra" was a German code
[p.437] which had been broken by
October 1940.
The naval historians might
also have helped him in his
description of the Norwegian
campaign. It was of course a
disaster for which much blame can
be attached to Churchill's handling
of the Fleet. But nothing in
Charmley's narrative clarifies a
very confusing campaign nor does
it add anything to our
understanding of Churchill's part
in it. Naturally judgements are
not lacking, "At this stage of the
war, and for years to come,
Churchill grossly overestimated
what could be achieved by seapower." [p.384] 11 This is a most
peculiar judgement about a
campaign in which the German
Navy had just achieved precisely
the sort of successful landing
operations of which Churchill so
often dreamt.
The domestic consequences of
this failure brings Charmley back
to his home ground, back to
snippets
from
diaries,
parliamentary debates and
Churchill's views ofhistory and his
oratory. For the next three chapters
we go through the summer of 1940,
a summer of cabinet meetings and
great speeches, for example
Churchill's speech on June 4th" ...
We shall go on to the end . . ." "It
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was" concludes Charmley, "sublime
- nonsense - but sublime
nonsense." [p.411] Perhaps we can
be persuaded to accept this
judgement if we were told
something about what actually
happened in the summer of 1940
outside Spears' and SackvilleWest's diaries, but this is a summer
of 1940 with no Germans at all. No
German aircraft over Britain, no
Dowding, who is not mentioned in
this account, no German invasion
plans, no German submarines
sinking ships and as we get to the
fall and winter, no Blitz. It is
indeed magic. Chapter 37, is
entitled "The Struggle for
Survival," but the survival that
Charmley has in mind is Churchill's
position as Prime Minister, not the
relationship between German and
British plans and actions. Almost
everything about the war is reduced
to single sentences, "The R.A.F.
could
maintain
Britain's
independence from Germany, but
there was not much anyone could
do to preserve it vis-a-vis America,"
[the only mention of the R.A.F. in
this connection, p.431] ... but to
follow this critique through would
mean dealing with virtually every
page of the book. As the war goes
on, German, Italian and Japanese
actions become more and more
remote, noises off-stage. The
Russo-German conflict gets one
sentence mentions here and there,
as do the U.S. campaigns in the
Pacific. To write a biography of
Churchill without the slightest
understanding of the course of the
war seems fool-hardy- but that is
essentially what Charmley has
done. The last chapters become
muddled and weave together
different themes often over-lapping
and sometimes contradictory. It is
all an attack on St. George, but
there are no dragons, except
Roosevelt and Stalin. Indeed while
poor Mosley gets arrested just to
support Churchill's attempt to find
unity at home [p. 425], there is no
mention ofNazi policies in occupied
Europe, not even the massacre of
the Jews.

The strain of recent events shows clearly in Churchill's

face at Moscow airport, 12 August 1942.
Charmley sums up his view of
what happened:
Germany, Churchill had said, was
a menace to the balance of power,
and it was obvious that her
ambitions were greater than
Hitler admitted; she must be
stopped. But in order to do so
Churchill was forced to bankrupt
Britain and mortgage its future to
the United States - and, in the
process, he had helped raise the
spectre of a menace which was
even greater than the one he had
destroyed, if only because there
was no balance of terror on the
Continent. Hitler had had to keep
an eye on the Soviet Union; who
did Stalin have to keep an eye
upon? This, then, was where the
road to victory led. [pp.589-90]
The "balance of power"
becomes a "balance of terror" within
the space of two sentences and the
notion that Stalin did not have to
keep his eye on a United States
and Britain armed with an atomic
bomb would no doubt come as a
surprise to him. But it is typical of
the kind of judgements that
Charmley offers, for while it is true

that the Soviet Union under Stalin
expanded into Eastern Europe at
the end ofthe war and that a reign
ofterror descended onto those areas
as well as Eastern Germany, it is
equally true that in contrast with
Hitler during the war, when all of
Europe lay under his power, Stalin
had "only" a small part of it. It was
not perhaps an ideal outcome of
the war, but it was not the total
catastrophe which Charmley
claims.
If Charmley set out to destroy
myths, as he says so often, he has
failed to do so, both because the
myths he tackles are petty and
because he has failed to understand
the major problems of the war and
with them Churchill's part in that
war. Perhaps some knowledge of
military history is, after all, a
requirement for writing about the
war. Moreover a totally insular
view of the world which revolves
exclusively around the diaries of
English politicians and "literati"
makes it difficult to understand a
World War. IfCharmleyis a typical
example ofthe new breed of British
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historians it is truly the "end of
Glory."
Possibly a reassessment of
Churchill has become necessary
fifty years after the end of the
Second World War, but none of the
books reviewed, except the first,
can be taken as a successful or
even a serious attempt at such a
task. Perhaps Taylor, a historian
also fond of "making the facts fit
his phrases," should have the last
word:
Late in life Churchill pronounced
a gloomy verdict on his career. He
remarked that the final verdict of
history would take account not
only of the victories achieved
under his direction, but also of the
political results which flowed from
them and he added: "Judged by
this standard, I am not sure that
I shall be held to have done very
well." Churchill did himself an
injustice. The results were not
his doing; the victories were. The
results were foreshadowed when
the British people resolved on war
with Hitler. From that moment
on it followed inexorably that,
unless Hitler won, Soviet Russia
would establish her domination of
Eastern Europe and b.et;ome a
world power. 12

Even that domination has now come
to an end.
The British Empire has also
gone, and despite Charmley, it was
not really inherited by the United
States; there are even those who
argue that Canada still has some
independence. Nor is it certain
that the end of Empires was
brought about by the war; the war
ironically only reinforced the
nationalism which was already
such a powerful force in the early
20th century. Churchill's place in
all this is clearly important but he
did not have the power to reverse
this trend. Among the Hitlers,
Stalins, Mussolinis and Francos
he can hardly be accused of making
the world an even worse place than
it already was. Whatever his faults

he, together with those who
supported him, and they were a
large portion of the British and
Dominion populations, managed,
with considerable difficulty, to
prevent Britain from suffering the
fate that befell nearly all of the
other European states at the hands
of theN azi Regime. If that is myth,
what is reality?
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